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Peak Coordinating Bodies and Invasive Alien
Species: Is the Whole Worth More Than the
Sum of Its Parts?
SOPHIE RILEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Invasive alien species (IAS) are alien species that threaten
1
ecosystems, habitats or other species. The threats posed by IAS have
2
been extensively documented, and include predation on native species,
* Senior lecturer, University of Technology Sydney. The author wishes to thank: the staff of the
National Invasive Species Council and in particular Stanley Burgiel and Chris Dionigi for hosting
her visit to the NISC and also for helpful suggestions on early drafts of this paper; Dr Niall Moore
from the Secretariat of the GB Non-Native Species Coordination Mechanism; and Angela
Robinson from the Invasive Non-Native Species Policy Rural and Environment Directorate for
assisting in face to face meetings. All errors and omissions remain the author’s. The research
undertaken for this paper was partly funded through a grant from the Public Purpose Fund of the
Law Society of New South Wales, Australia and partly through a study leave grant from the
University of Technology Sydney. Research assistance provided by Cleary Castrission is
gratefully acknowledged.
1. U.N.E.P., Alien Species: Guiding Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and
Mitigation of Impacts, 5th Meeting, Jan. 31–Feb. 4, 2000, 257, UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/5/5 (Oct.
22, 1999).
2. Ted Center, et al., Biological Invasions: Stemming the Tide in Florida, 1 FLA.
ENTOMOLOGIST 45, 78 (1995); Steve L. Coles & Lucius G. Eldredge, Nonindigenous Species
Introductions on Coral Reefs: A Need for Information, 56 PACIFIC SCIENCE 191 (2002); Lyle
Glowka, Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal
Issues in the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 329 (1999–
2000); Lyle Glowka & Cyril de Klemm, International Instrument, Processes and Non-indigenous
Species Introductions–Is a Protocol Necessary?, 27 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 247 (1997); Peter
Jenkins, Paying for Protection from Invasive Species, 67 ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(Fall 2002) available at http://www.issues.org/19.1/jenkins.htm; Todd E. McDowell, SlowMotion Explosion: The Global Threat of Exotic Species and the International Response to the
Problem in the South Pacific, 9 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 187 (1998); Jeff McNeely,
Invasive Species; A Costly Catastrophe for Native Biodiversity, Land Use and Water Resources
Research (2002) available at http://www.luwrr.com/uploads/paper01-02.pdf; Anne M. Perrault &
William Carroll Muffett; Turning Off the Tap: A Strategy to Address International Aspects of
Invasive Alien Species, 11 (2) REVIEW OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 211 (2002); GLOBAL INVASIVE SPECIES PROGRAMME (GISP), GLOBAL
STRATEGY ON INVASIVE ALIEN SPECIES (Jeffrey A. McNeely et al. eds. 2001), available at
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modification of habitat, and introduction of pests and diseases. Each of
these impacts has the potential to lead to a decline in biodiversity,
4
including irreversible outcomes such as species’ extinctions. Notorious
5
examples of IAS include rabbits and cane toads in Australia, the Giant
African Snail and Red Imported Fire Ant in the United States of
6
America (US), and grey squirrels and the Chinese Mitten Crab in the
7
United Kingdom. It is telling that, at the time of writing, each of these
examples are also categorized by the International Union for the
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) as one of the 100 worst invasive species
8
in the world.
Although governments are increasingly aware of the need to
develop effective IAS regimes, regulators face many challenges. To
start with, IAS regimes rarely start from a clean slate. Indeed, they often
derive from measures initially designed to protect primary production
from pests and diseases. Accordingly, in many jurisdictions, IAS
regulation is best developed for the agricultural product sector and
represents what has been described as a “crisis” response to a chronic
9
problem. As such, regulation is often fragmentary, with gaps in
coverage interposed by areas of overlap. Moreover, the design and
http://www.fws.gov/invasives/volunteersTrainingModule/pdf/bigpicture/globalstrategy.pdf; Marc
L. Miller & Lance Gunderson, Biological and Cultural Camouflage: The Challenges of Seeing
the Harmful Invasive Species Problem and Doing Something About It, in HARMFUL INVASIVE
SPECIES: LEGAL RESPONSES (Marc Miller and Robert Fabian, eds., Environmental Law Institute
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=452982.
3. CLAIRE SHINE, NATTLEY WILLIAMS, AND LOTHAR GüNDING, A GUIDE TO DESIGNING
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS ON ALIEN INVASIVE SPECIES 1.4 (2000).
4. AN INVENTORY OF ALIEN SPECIES AND THEIR THREAT TO BIODIVERSITY AND
ECONOMY IN SWITZERLAND 9 (Rüdiger Wittenberg ed., 2005) [hereinafter AN INVENTORY OF
ALIEN SPECIES]; Stokes, K., O'Neill, K. & McDonald, Invasive Species in Ireland
(2004)(unpublished Report to Environment & Heritage Service and National Parks & Wildlife
Service); State of the Environment Report, Environment Protection Authority 1997, ¶ 2.6 (NSW)
(Austl.); GREG SHERLEY AND SARAH LOWE TOWARDS A REGIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES
STRATEGY FOR THE SOUTH PACIFIC: ISSUES AND OPTIONS, 1 (2000).
5. DEPARTMENT OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENVIRONMENT, WATER, POPULATION AND
ANIMALS
IN
AUSTRALIA,
available
at
COMMUNITIES: FERAL
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/ferals/index.html (last visited Nov. 2012).
6. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES INFORMATION CENTRE: LIST OF INVASIVE ANIMALS,
http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/animals/main.shtml (last visited Nov. 2012). The Zebra
Mussel is also a notorious invasive species in the United States of America.
7. U.K. FORESTRY COMMISSION: SQUIRRELS AND ENGLAND’S WOODLANDS (2013),
http://www.forestry.gov.uk/greysquirrel; Chinese Mitten Crab, Factsheet, Woodlands (2006) (last
visited Sept. 2011); Chinese Mitten Crab, NATURAL HISTORY MUSEUM (2013),
http://www.nhm.ac.uk/nature-online/life/other-invertebrates/chinese-mitten-crabs/index.html (last
visited Sept. 2011).
8. 100 of the World’s Worst Invasive Species, INVASIVE SPECIES SPECIALIST GROUP
(2008), available at http://www.issg.org/worst100_species.html (last visited Sept. 2011).
9. DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS WORKING GROUP, REVIEW OF NONNATIVE SPECIES POLICY REPORT, 2003, DEFRA at 21–22 (U.K.) [hereinafter FOOD AND RURAL
AFFAIRS]; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE INVASIVE SPECIES
POLICY: 2002-2009 (2010).

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Peak Coordinating Bodies and Invasive Alien Species

455

implementation of measures is further complicated by the presence of a
range of jurisdictions, government agencies, and interest groups. Part of
the problem flows from the tendency of each unit to consider the IAS
problem according to its specific remit and thus in isolation from the
regime as a whole. Hence, a common but problematic challenge for
regulators is deciding how to coordinate and synthesize processes across
many lines of responsibility and levels of government.10
To deal with these types of challenges, authorities in jurisdictions
such as the US and Great Britain (GB) have established peak bodies to
coordinate the regulatory response to IAS. These bodies are well-placed
to consider the “big picture” and to take the lead in implementing
initiatives that can draw the regime together, including: developing
overarching policy, defining an IAS, providing services, such as onestop information portals, and fostering community engagement. In this
study, these types of bodies are described as “peak coordinating bodies”
(PCBs). In Australia, the use of PCBs has been dismissed, primarily on
the basis that they duplicate systems and procedures already established
at the Federal, State and Territory levels.
The purpose of this paper is to undertake a comparative study of
IAS regulation in Australia, the US and GB in order to evaluate whether
coordination mechanisms instituted by way of a peak body duplicate
processes found at other levels of government; or whether such bodies
add value to existing regulation by fostering a greater level of efficiency
than would otherwise flow from the individual components of the
regime. Australia, the US and GB have been selected for discussion
because they illustrate different approaches for dealing with the IAS
challenge in the context of multi-layered systems of regulation.
The Australian regime operates within a Federal system of
government and is characterized by a large volume of law and policy
11
that lacks an overarching coordinating body. By way of contrast, the
US regime, which also operates within a Federal system, enjoys the
benefit of a peak coordinating body that targets IAS-related activities
12
across a range of Federal departments and bureaus. The US body,
however, has no direct power with respect to State and Territory
agencies. Great Britain has similarly adopted a coordinated approach to
IAS by establishing the GB Non-Native Species Coordination
10. U.N.E.P., supra note 1, ¶¶ 10 (b), (c), (d) and (f); DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL
AFFAIRS,THE INVASIVE NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK STRATEGY FOR GREAT BRITAIN
(2008) [hereinafter NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK]; ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE,
supra note 9, at 15.
11. Sophie Riley, Law is Order, and Good Law is Good Order: the Role of Governance in
the Regulation of Invasive Alien Species, 1 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 16, 27 (2012).
12. NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, http://www.invasivespecies.gov (last visited Nov.
2012).
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Mechanism. While GB does not operate as a Federal system of
government, regulators still need to take into account the power of
semi-autonomous parliaments, such as those established in Scotland and
Wales. Accordingly, as with Australia and the US, GB also faces many
real-world difficulties in coordinating initiatives across an array of
processes and jurisdictions.
The comparative methodology adopted for this study is largely
based on the functionalist approach that focuses on similarities among
the three jurisdictions. In doing so, however, the writer is mindful of the
lively debate surrounding the functionalist versus contextualist
approaches and the practicality of using functionalism as a “rule of
14
thumb.” Accordingly, while the legal rules and institutions of the three
jurisdictions can be roughly compared, some rules and institutions may
15
appear similar, but operate in different ways, and vice versa. The study
further combines what Professor Jaakko Husa has described as the
“legislator’s standpoint,” with the “harmonizer’s standpoint” to search
16
for models as solutions to problems. The “legislator’s standpoint”
critiques the models against the Australian system; while the
17
“harmonizer’s standpoint” searches for the “best” model.
This paper will provide a short overview of the systems of
government applied in Australia, the US and GB, and explain how this
impacts the design and implementation of their IAS regimes. This paper
will then examine the IAS regimes themselves, highlighting the use of
peak bodies, related institutions and coordinating mechanisms. This
paper argues that coordination is essential to the effective operation of
IAS regimes and that in order to achieve this objective, it is crucial to
establish peak bodies that can act as a focal point for open dialogue and
consistency of approach.
II. SYSTEMS OF GOVERNMENT: AUSTRALIA, UNITED STATES
AND GREAT BRITAIN
An examination of the systems of government in Australia, the US

13. GB
NON-NATIVE
SPECIES
COORDINATION
MECHANISM,
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/home/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 2012).
14. See, e.g., Jaakko Husa & Jan Smits, A Dialogue on Comparative Functionalism, 18
MASSTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 554 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1965933.
15. Id.
16. COMPARATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: CASE STUDIES AND
METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, AUG. 15–17 2007, FINNISH ENVIRONMENT INSTITUTE 5,
available at http://www.aka.fi/Tiedostot/Tiedostot/ENVLAW/comparative%20report.pdf; see
also Lin Harmon, Teaching Environmental Law from a Global Resources Perspective, Paper
Presented at the 10th Annual Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of Environmental Law (July
2012).
17. Id.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Peak Coordinating Bodies and Invasive Alien Species

457

18

and GB is important to developing an understanding of the policy and
legislative context of IAS regimes in each jurisdiction. In particular, it
helps to explain constitutional and political limitations on the exercise
of power by a centralized authority, which in turn shapes attitudes
towards the creation of PCBs.
Australia is established as a constitutional monarchy with a
Federal system of government. In accordance with the Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Imp) (“Australian Constitution”),
law-making powers are shared between the Federal, State and Territory
19
parliaments. The majority of powers available to the Federal
government are the “concurrent” powers, set out in section 51 of the
20
Australian Constitution. In theory, these powers are exercisable by
21
both the State and Federal parliaments; however the High Court of
Australia has interpreted many of these powers as falling within the
22
exclusive domain of the Federal parliament. Any matters not referred
to in the Australian constitution are known as the residual powers,
23
which are exercisable solely by the States and Territories. The
environment is not specifically mentioned in section 51; hence, until the
early 1980s it was presumed that, in line with land and resource
management, the exercise of environmental regulation was a residual
24
power vested in State and Territory parliaments. Such powers
extended to dealings with weeds, feral animals and other agricultural
25
pests.
18. Although the paper later mentions devolved powers in Northern Ireland, the focus
remains on England, Scotland and Wales, which together comprise Great Britain. Hence the term
Great Britain is used in this paper, rather than the term, United Kingdom, which would also
include Northern Ireland.
19. Australia’s Federal system of government comprises: the Federal or Commonwealth
government, the governments of the six states (Queensland, New South Wales, Victoria,
Tasmania, South Australia, and Western Australia) and the two territories (the Northern Territory
and the Australian Capital Territory).
20. A small number of powers, largely those found in section 52, are exercisable exclusively
by the Federal parliament. These powers primarily relate to the seat of government of the
Commonwealth and places acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes.
21. These powers include quarantine under section 51(ix), census and statistics under
section 51 (xi) and the external affairs under section 51(xxix). In situations of conflict between
valid State and Federal laws, section 109 of the Constitution provides that State law gives way to
the extent of the inconsistency; see Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1.
22. See, e.g., TONY BLACKSHIELD, GEORGE WILLIAMS, & BRIAN F. FITZGERALD,
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THEORY, 325–74, 885–929 (5th ed. 2010) (discussing
the interpretation of the Constitution and the scope of the external affairs power therein).
23. The residual legislative power that the States have covers a wide range of matters,
including health, education and the environment.
24. Australian Senate, Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the Arts
Committee Commonwealth Environment Powers, COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (1999) ¶
2.1–14, 6.1.
25. See, e.g., Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act, 1976 (W. Austl.);
Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act 1976 (WA) (Austl.); Plant Diseases Act 1924
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In 1983, however, the High Court of Australia held that the
external affairs power in section 51(xxix) of the Australian Constitution
“authorizes a law which gives effect to an obligation imposed on
Australia by a bona fide international convention or treaty to which
26
Australia is a party . . . .” While this power extends to environmental
matters, it has never endowed the Federal government with a carte
27
blanche to legislate across the board for protection of the environment.
Key restrictions center on the proportionality between the purpose of
the treaty and the means by which the law seeks to achieve that
28
purpose. Notwithstanding these limitations, Australia is a signatory to
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), and is thus under
obligation to comply with the convention, including article 8(h), which
specifies that members should “prevent the introduction of, or control or
29
eradicate those alien species which threaten” biodiversity. It is
arguable that the Federal government could have legislated in a broad
manner to provide uniform regulation with respect to the deleterious
impacts of IAS.
As just noted, however, land and resource management, including
the regulation of what are now termed IAS, has historically been a
30
matter for determination by the States and Territories, with some
31
legislation pre-dating the Australian Constitution. By 1992, when
Australia ratified the CBD, State and Territory initiatives had already
extended across a range of IAS-related matters, including stopping the
32
introduction and spread of pests and diseases, as well as protecting
33
rural land.
Consequently, even if the Federal Government were mindful of
legislating for broad-scale IAS management, such regulation would
intersect with pre-existing arrangements already established by the
34
States and Territories. Indeed, the 1980s saw increasing debate on how
(NSW) (Austl.); Plant Diseases Control Act 1979 (NT) (Austl.).
26. Commonwealth v Tasmania, (1983) 158 CLR 1, ¶ 5 (Austl.); see also Jacqueline Peel &
Lee Godden, Australian Environmental Management: A ‘Dams’ Story, 28 U.N.S.W.L.J. 668,
668–75 (2005).
27. See James Crawford, The Constitution and the Environment, 13 SYDNEY L. REV. 11,
21–24 (1991).
28. Commonwealth, supra note 26, ¶ 54.
29. Convention on Biological Diversity, Article 8(h), [1992], 1760 U.N.T.S. 79 (Austl.).
The Convention entered into force December, 29 1993. It had 193 Parties as of November 2012.
30. GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN AUSTRALIA 76 (6th ed. 2006).
31. The Australian State of Victoria, for example, introduced the Thistle Act 1890 (Vic) to
oversee the eradication of thistles some ten years before Federation.
32. See generally Plant Diseases Act 1924 (NSW) (Austl.); Noxious Weeds Act 1921 (ACT);
Stock Diseases Act 1923 (NSW); Noxious Weed Act 1950 (WA); and Vermin and Noxious Weeds
Act 1958 (Vic).
33. See, e.g., Pastures Protection Act 1934, (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
34. BATES, supra note 30, at 76.
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Federal, State, and Territory Governments could create “mutually
agreed institutional and policy-making mechanisms” that took into
account governance concerns stemming from each level of
35
government. The pathway eventually chosen was a political one,
designated “co-operative Federalism.”
Co-operative Federalism operates through the Council of
Australian Governments (COAG), which is a peak inter-governmental
body established in 1992. The members of COAG consist of the Prime
Minister of Australia, the Premiers of each of the six States, the Chief
Ministers of the two Territories and the President of the Australian
Local Government Association. COAG’s decisions are made by
consensus and the Council develops and monitors the implementation of
policy reforms that are of national significance. The latter are
determined by consultation amongst ministers, including at meetings of
COAG. COAG is assisted by the operation of Commonwealth-State
Ministerial Councils (Ministerial Councils), and the development of
36
Intergovernmental Agreements and national strategies. The regulation
of IAS is not designated as a matter of national significance. Hence, the
Federal government does not provide a comprehensive regulatory
37
regime for dealing with these species. Rather, as discussed below, the
regime is characterized by a mix of laws and strategies that deal with
individual aspects of the IAS problem.
The US is similarly governed by a Federal system of government.
Unlike Australia, however, the US is established as a Federal
constitutional republic with an elected president as head-of-state rather
than the reigning monarch of the United Kingdom. Notwithstanding this
fundamental difference, the US and Australian parliamentary systems
have much in common. To begin with, law-making powers in both
jurisdictions are shared between a centralized government and
state/territory governments. In addition, both jurisdictions enjoy the
benefit of a written constitution that enumerates heads of power that the
respective Federal parliaments can exercise. In the Constitution of the
United States (“US Constitution”), these include powers found in
Article I, section 8, authorizing the US parliament (Congress) to
38
legislate on matters such as the coining of currency, the maintenance
39
of military forces and the regulation of commerce with foreign
35. Id.
36. Other institutions include specialist sub-committees. See BATES, supra note 30, at 78.
37. In accordance with the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(Cth) matters of national environmental significance are: world heritage properties, national
heritage places, wetlands of international importance, listed threatened species and ecological
communities, migratory species, Commonwealth marine areas, the Great Barrier Reef Marine
Park and nuclear actions.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
39. Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 12, 13.
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40

countries. Matters not precisely listed in Article I, section 8 are
classified as “residual” powers that fall within the legislative domain of
the states and territories. As with the Australian Constitution, the US
Constitution does not specifically refer to the environment, this
traditionally being regarded as a matter under state and territory
jurisdiction.
The structure of both the Australian and US constitutions evinces a
clear intent to leave a large volume of “residual” powers in the hands of
41
the States and to create Federal legislatures with limited central
42
powers. In both jurisdictions, however, judicial interpretation of the
43
constitution has led to a different result. As already noted, in Australia,
an expansive interpretation of the external affairs power has given the
Federal government a potentially wide ambit over environmental
matters; while in the US, a similar result has been achieved by the
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the commerce power and the
provisions in Article VI, clause 2 of the US Constitution, which
44
specifies that treaties are the “supreme law of the land.” In Missouri v
Holland, the Supreme Court interpreted this clause and Article II,
section 2, which relates to the President’s power to enter into treaties, to
allow Federal laws to override State laws where the Federal law is
45
designed to give effect to a treaty.
One point of difference between the US and Australia is that the
US has not ratified the CBD and has not, therefore, accepted obligations
46
with respect to Article 8(h) of that convention. Consequently, attempts
by Congress to introduce uniform IAS regulation that conflict with State
laws may run afoul of the Missouri v Holland doctrine. It is, however,
40. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
41. James A. Thompson, American and Australian Constitutions: Continuing Adventures in
Comparative Constitutional Law, 30 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 627 (1996–97). Notwithstanding this
intent, it should also be kept in mind that the constitutions of Australia and the US contain other
provisions that may curtail the exercise of power by states. For example, Sections 9 and 10 of
Article I of the US Constitution limit the exercise of legislative power by both state and federal
governments so that neither may grant any title of nobility. In Australia, section 52 of the
Australian Constitution sets out powers that may be exercised exclusively by the federal
government.
42. Id. at 652–53; see generally TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, supra note 22
(discussing generally the interpretation of the Constitution and the scope of the external affairs
power).
43. Thomson, supra note 41, at 652–53.
44. LACKLAND H. BLOOM, JR., METHODS OF INTERPRETATION: HOW THE SUPREME COURT
READS THE CONSTITUTION 344 (2009).
45. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
46. The US, however, is a member of other international treaties that relate to IAS, including
the Marrakesh Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, adopted 15 April 1994,
[1995] ATS No 8, 1 (entered into force 1 January 1995). As of November 2012, the WTO has
157 members. The Marrakesh Agreement consists of the agreement to set up the WTO and a
number of annexures, including the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures that influences the design and implementation of national quarantine regimes.
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arguable that the US would be liable under customary international law,
with respect to the deleterious impacts of IAS that emanate from its
territory, although the precise nature and extent of such obligations are
47
not clearly delineated. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, the fact
48
remains that IAS are a threat to US biodiversity; and the Federal
government has responded to this challenge by proclaiming Executive
49
Order 13112 on Invasive Alien Species (Executive Order 13112).
Executive orders operate as an addition to the legislative powers of
Congress. They are legally binding orders issued by the President that
give direction to Federal agencies and departments in the exercise of
their functions under existing laws. Accordingly, following the issuing
of Executive Order 13112 by President Clinton on February 3, 1999,
provisions of the order applied directly to Federal agencies and
departments, but not State agencies.50 The order itself is designed to
prevent the introduction of, and otherwise regulate, invasive species.
Unlike the US, and similar to Australia, the UK is a constitutional
monarchy. The UK, however, does not have a written constitution.
Instead, its constitution is found in sources such as treaties, legislation,
judicial pronouncements, and formative instruments, including the
51
Magna Carta. Prior to 1997 the UK was governed by the parliament at
Westminster, that comprising the House of Commons, the House of
Lords and the reigning monarch. This parliament had power to legislate
for environmental matters across the board, including with respect to
52
IAS.
Since 1997, however, the UK government has followed a
decentralization policy, which amongst other things, has generated a
devolution of environmental law-making powers. The UK has, for
example, devolved legislative power on a Scottish unicameral
Parliament that now legislates on a wide range of matters, including
47. See generally Sophie Riley, Preventing Transboundary Harm from Invasive Alien
Species, 18 REV. OF EUROPEAN CMTY. & INT’L L. 198 (2009).
48. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, Factsheet on Invasive Species,
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/Factsheets/Issue_Overview.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012).
49. The preamble to Executive Order No 13112 on Invasive Alien Species, states, “the
authority to make the order is vested in the President by virtue of: the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), the Non-indigenous Aquatic Nuisance
Prevention and Control Act of 1990, as amended (16 U.S.C. 4701 et seq.), the Lacey Act, as
amended (18 U.S.C. 42), the Federal Plant Pest Act (7 U.S.C. 150aa et seq.), the Federal
Noxious Weed Act of 1974, as amended (7 U.S.C. 2801 et seq.), and the Endangered Species Act
of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.).” Exec. Order No. 13112, 3 C.F.R. 159 (1999),
available at http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/eos/eo13112.html (last visited Nov. 2012).
50. See Exec. Order No. 13112, supra note 49.
51. For sources and commentary on the constitutional conventions of the UK, see generally
MALCOLM JACK ET AL., ERSKINE MAY’S TREATISE ON THE LAW, PRIVILEGES, PROCEEDINGS
AND USAGE OF PARLIAMENT (23rd ed. 2011).
52. See, e.g., Countryside Act, 1968, c. 41 (Eng.); Prevention of Oil Pollution Act, 1971, c.
60 (Eng.).
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education, health and the environment; although not on matters
“reserved” for the UK government, such as currency, national security
53
and foreign policy. In a similar vein, legislative power has also been
devolved to the National Assembly for Wales and the Northern Ireland
54
Assembly. As England does not have its own separate parliament,
Westminster, the Parliament of the UK, undertakes legislative functions
55
for England. Following the process of devolution, representatives of
the governments of the UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
entered into a memorandum of understanding that created a Joint
56
Ministerial Committee. Part of the function of the Committee is to
facilitate discussion on the way that devolved powers are implemented
57
in different parts of the UK.
At first glance, the system of government in the UK appears to be
“quasi- Federal” because it involves sharing law-making powers
amongst Westminster and the legislative institutions of Scotland, Wales
and Northern Ireland. As England, however, does not have its own
parliament and is ruled directly from Westminster, the UK lacks a true
sharing of powers, as opposed to Australia and the US. At the same
time, Australia, the US and the UK operate under multi-layers of
governments, agencies and departments. Accordingly, regulators face
similar problems, particularly with respect to coordinating policies,
activities and competing values across the range of institutions that
touch upon IAS. Indeed, as will be discussed in the next section, the
need to implement effective coordination mechanisms is a common
policy theme in all three jurisdictions; yet, governance structures and
regulation vary greatly.

53. Scotland Act, 1998, sched. 5, (Eng.).
54. Devolution did not occur uniformly through the UK. For example, the National
Assembly for Wales derives the majority of its legislative powers from the Government of Wales
Act 2006. Unlike the devolution of power to Scotland, the Government of Wales Act 1998
merely permitted the National Assembly of Wales to make secondary legislation as authorised by
the UK Parliament. With respect to Northern Ireland, the Belfast Agreement established the
Northern Ireland Assembly and, in accordance with section of 4 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998,
devolved powers to the Assembly are the equivalent of “transferred powers”. Devolution of
powers was suspended in 2002 and restored in 2007 with the entry into force of the Northern
Ireland Act 2006.
55. Peter Leyland, Devolution, the British Constitution and the Distribution of Power, 53 N.
IR. LEGAL Q. 408, 413–16 (2002).
56. UNITED KINGDOM GOVERNMENT, THE SCOTTISH MINISTERS, THE WELSH MINISTERS,
AND THE NORTHERN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING AND
SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENTS, 2010, Cm. 7864, ¶¶ 23–25 Part I.
57. Id. at A1.2(b).
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III. IAS REGIMES: AUSTRALIA, THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
1. Australia
In Australia, the Federal Parliament has enacted the Quarantine
Act, 1908 (Cth) (The Quarantine Act) and the Environment Protection
and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), both of
which are important to the regulation of IAS.58 The former statute is
intended to prevent or control the introduction of pests, diseases and
59
IAS, including those that impact the environment. The Quarantine Act
is supported by regulations and proclamations such as Quarantine
60
Proclamation 1998, which prohibits the entry of animals, plants and
their products into Australia, unless they are already on an authorized
61
list, or have been assessed and granted a permit for their importation.
Although the Quarantine Act establishes border controls to prevent the
entry of unwanted species, it does not deal with permitted species that
develop into an IAS. Nor does the Act deal with species already present
in Australia, such as those introduced prior to 1998, that prove to be
invasive.
At the time of writing, the Federal Parliament released a draft
exposure of the Biosecurity Bill 2012.62 The Bill updates Australia’s
biosecurity arrangements, yet apart from one or two isolated examples,
such as the regulation of ballast water, does not fully engage with the
linkages stemming from invasive alien species, biosecurity and the
environment.63 Accordingly, if a species proves to be invasive, it is still
largely left to the states and territories to implement their own
measures.64
The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act
1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), was designed to fulfil Australia’s international
obligations under various international instruments, including Article

58. Quarantine Act No. 3 of 1908 (Cth) s 4(b) (Austl.); Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Austl.).
59. Quarantine Act No. 3 of 1908, supra note 58. References to the environment were added
to the Quarantine Act after the Nairn Report recommended that the scope of quarantine should be
extended to the natural environment. See M. E. NAIRN, P. G. ALLEN, A. R. INGLIS AND C.
TANNER, AUSTRALIAN QUARANTINE: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY ¶ 2.2.4 (1996).
60. Quarantine
Proclamation
1998
(Austl.),
available
at
http://www.comlaw.gov.au/comlaw/legislation/legislativeinstrumentcompilation1.nsf/current/byti
tle/AE38C4F883931ACECA256FC60003F7DB?OpenDocument&mostrecent=1.
61. Essentially, only plant seeds listed in Schedule 5 of Quarantine Proclamation are
permitted entry. All other importation of plant and animal products must undergo a risk
assessment. Quarantine Act No. 3 of 1908, supra note 58.
62. Exposure Draft: Biosecurity Bill 2012 (Cth) (Austl.).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 4.
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8(h) of the Convention on Biological Diversity.65 That article stipulates
that parties are under obligation to prevent or control the introduction of
species that threaten biodiversity.66 One means afforded by the EPBC
for complying with that provision is to list the deleterious impacts of
67
IAS as a “key threatening process.” Indeed, numerous key threatening
processes directly related to IAS have been accepted for listing,
including: predation, competition and land degradation by rabbits, feral
cats, rats; and loss of biodiversity caused by the yellow crazy ant, cane
68
toads and the red fire ant. Once a threatening process has been listed,
the Minister must prepare a threat-abatement plan, but only if he or she
considers that such a plan is a “feasible, effective and efficient way to
abate the process.”69
The listing process is not infallible, as demonstrated by the events
surrounding the listing of escaped garden plants as a key threatening
process.70 In January 2010, the Minister accepted that “Loss and
Degradation of Native Plant and Animal Habitat by Invasion of Escaped
Garden Plants, Including Aquatic Plants,” should be listed as a key
71
threatening process under the EPBC. At the same time, the Minister
also decided that a threat abatement plan was not a feasible, effective or
efficient way to abate the process because existing institutions
established under the auspices of the Australian Weeds Strategy were
sufficient to deal with escaped garden plans.72 Yet, gaps and
inconsistencies with weed regulation in Australia are notorious and have
73
been well documented in the literature.
65. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (Austl.)
[hereinafter EPBC Act].
66. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 29.
67. See EPBC Act, supra note 65, §§ 528, 188(4). A “threatening process” is defined as one
that threatens the survival, abundance, or evolutionary development of a native species or
ecological community.
68. Listed Key Threatening Processes, (Nov. 25, 2009), AUSTRALIAN GOV’T
DEPT. OF SUSTAINABILITY ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES, (Nov. 25, 2009),
available at http://www.environment.gov.au/cgi-bin/sprat/public/publicgetkeythreats (last visited
Mar. 2011).
69. EPBC Act, supra note 65, § 270A(2).
70. Threatened Species Scientific Committee, Advice to the Minister for the Environment,
Heritage and the Arts from the Threatened Species Scientific Committee (the Committee) on
Amendments to the List of Key Threatening Processes under the Environment Protection and
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (EPBC Act), Australian Gov’t Dept. of Sustainability Env’t,
Water,
Population
and
Communities,
available
at
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/threatened/ktp/pubs/garden-plants-listing-advice.pdf
(last visited June 2011).
71. Id.
72. Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Weeds Strategy,
Australian Government, Australian Weeds Committee, 9 (2006).
73. RICHARD GROVES, ROBERT BODEN & MARK LONSDALE, JUMPING THE GARDEN
FENCE: INVASIVE PLANTS IN AUSTRALIA AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPACTS 29, 71, 73 (WWF-Australia, 2005); PAUL MARTIN, ROBYN BARTEL, JACK SINDEN,
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The Federal government has also developed a number of strategies
and plans that relate to IAS. These include the Australian Weeds
Strategy and the Australian Pest Animal Strategy, as well as Australia’s
74
Biodiversity Conservation Strategy 2010-2030. Marine pests, in
particular, have been the target of concerted efforts.75 In 2005, the
Federal, State and Territory governments negotiated the
Intergovernmental Agreement on a National System for the Prevention
76
and Management of Marine Pest Incursions. The Agreement provides
77
for cooperative efforts, consistency of measures and the establishment
78
of a National Standing Committee to coordinate measures.
At the State and Territory levels, authorities have established
regimes for dealing with the eradication and control of declared animals
79
and weeds, as well as regulation of species that impact on the natural
environment.80 In the latter case, some states, such as New South Wales,
81
have drafted Invasive Species Plans; while in other cases, legislation
provides for listing the deleterious impacts of IAS as a threatening
82
process.
NEIL GUNNINGHAM, IAN HANNAM, DEVELOPING A GOOD REGULATORY PRACTICE MODEL FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IMPACTING ON FARMERS – OVERVIEW, RESEARCH REPORT, 2
23 (2007), available at http://lwa.gov.au/files/products/social-and-institutional-researchprogram/pk071355/pk071355.pdf; JACK SNIDEN, RANDALL JONES, SUSIE HESTER et al., THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF WEEDS IN AUSTRALIA, 25 (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.southwestnrm.org.au/sites/default/files/uploads/ihub/sinden-j-et-al-2003-economicimpact-weeds-australia.pdf.
74. NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT MINISTERIAL COUNCIL (AUSTRALIAN GOV’T,
DEP’T OF SUSTAINABILITY, ENV’T, WATER, POPULATION AND COMMUNITIES), AUSTRALIA’S
BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION STRATEGY 2010-2030, 9 (2010), available at
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/publications/strategy-2010-30/pubs/biodiversitystrategy-2010.pdf.
75. Id. at 24; Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian Pest Animal
Strategy – A National Strategy for the Management of Vertebrate Pest Animals in Australia,
OF
THE
ENV’T
AND
WATER
RES.
(i)
(2007),
available
at
DEP’T
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/publications/pubs/pest-animal-strategy.pdf
(Aus.) [hereinafter NRMMC]; Natural Resource Management Ministerial Council, Australian
Weeds Strategy, Australian Government, Australian Weeds Committee, iv (2006).
76. Intergovernmental Agreement on a National System for the Prevention and Management
of
Marine
Pest
Incursions,
http://www.marinepests.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/772864/Marine_IGA.pdf (last visited
Nov. 2012).
77. Id. at 3–6.
78. Id. at 6.
79. See, e.g., Agriculture and Related Resources Protection Act, 1976 (W. Austl.) 40
(Austl.), Catchment and Land Protection Act, 1994 (Vict.) 95–140 (Austl.), Plant Quarantine
Act, 1997 (Tas.) (Austl.), Weeds Management Act, 2001 (N. Terr.) 5–10 (Austl.).
80. Catchment and Land Protection Act, supra note 79, at 9; Plant Quarantine Act, supra
note 79.
81. New South Wales Invasive Species Plan 2008-2015, N.S.W. GOV’T DEP’T. OF INDUS.,
(Aug.
2008),
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/236900/nsw-invasivespecies-plan.pdf.
82. Threatened Species Conservation Act, 1995 (N.S.W.) s 6 (Austl.). Not all Australian
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The consequence of this assortment of instruments is that while
Australian policy highlights the importance of establishing an effective
IAS regime, the regime itself operates in a piecemeal, fragmented and
83
inconsistent manner. Indeed, the major piece of legislation dealing
with protection of biodiversity at the Commonwealth level—the
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999
(CTH)—contains few special provisions to deal with IAS.84 Section
301A does stipulate that regulations may be promulgated to tackle IAS,
yet to date only one regulation has been made:85 Regulation 12.66 that
allows a park warden to implement measures in a Commonwealth
reserve to control or remove non-native species.86
Given the fragmented and ad hoc development of the regime,
environmental groups have long called for more effective leadership by
87
the Federal government. One development that has the potential to
establish a more harmonised IAS regime is the Intergovernmental
88
Agreement on Biosecurity. The aim of the Agreement is to extend
Australia’s existing biosecurity arrangements to the species that impact
89
the economy, environment and community. While the Agreement has
the potential to create an overarching strategy to prevent the
introduction and establishment of invasive animals, plants and diseases,
it does not tackle the problem of IAS that has already been
established.90
In 2002, the fragmented and inconsistent nature of Australia’s IAS
regime prompted Senator Andrew Bartlett to introduce the Environment
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Invasive
Species) Bill 2002 (“Invasive Species Bill”) into Federal Parliament as
States afford a legislative base for listing of threatening processes. Western Australia, Northern
Territory, South Australia, Tasmania, and Queensland, for example, do not accommodate official
lists of Key Threatening Processes.
83. Sophie Riley, Law is Order, and Good Law is Good Order: the Role of Governance in
the Regulation of Invasive Alien Species, 29 ENVTL. & PLAN. L. J. 16, 29 (2012).
84. See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) § 301A
(Austl.).
85. Id.
86. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Regulations, 228–301, 2000
(Austl.).
87. See, e.g., Australian Parliament Senate Env’t, Commc’ns, Info. Tech. and the Arts
References Comm., TURNING BACK THE TIDE: THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE [REPORT ON
THE REGULATION, CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF INVASIVE SPECIES AND THE ENVIRONMENT
PROTECTION AND BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AMENDMENT (INVASIVE SPECIES) BILL 2002
(2004),
available
at
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=ecita_ctte/c
ompleted_inquiries/2004-07/invasive_species/report/report.pdf.
88. Council
of
Australian
Gov’ts
(COAG),
Intergovernmental
Agreement
on
Biosecurity,
COAG
(Jan.
2012),
http://www.coag.gov.au/node/47 (last visited Nov. 2012).
89. Id. at 3.
90. Intergovernmental Agreement on Biosecurity, supra note 88.
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a private member’s Bill.91 The Bill was designed to provide for better
coordination of measures to deal with IAS.92 Amongst other things, it
93
would have created a national database of invasive alien species and
94
established an Invasive Species Advisory Committee.
The
composition of the Committee would have been widely drawn,
providing a voice to non-government organizations, community groups
and Indigenous peoples.95 As such, the Committee would have acted as
a unifying institution by drawing together a diverse range of
stakeholders to advise cabinet Ministers of the impacts of IAS.96
The Bill was defeated in Federal Parliament, but triggered a senate
inquiry, which was published as a report in 2004 entitled, Turning Back
the Tide, the Invasive Species Challenge (the Senate Invasive Species
Inquiry).97 The inquiry identified a range of shortcomings of the Bill,
many of which centered on the imbalance that the Bill would have
created with respect to governance mechanisms established under cooperative Federalism.98 Indeed, several State and Territory governments
voiced their concerns at the scope and breadth of powers that the
Federal government would need to exercise in order to implement the
99
provisions of the Bill. The senate was also of the view that the Bill
was redundant, as it duplicated regulation established by the EPBC Act
and also conflicted with regimes developed by the states and
100
territories. The Senate concluded that:
[t]he Bill’s single greatest strength is symbolic. It represents an
attempt to codify in one piece of legislation a range of regulations
currently scattered throughout the statute books which relate to the
regulation, control and management of invasive species. This is a
commendable, if somewhat idealistic, approach as there may be
risks and confusion arising from . . . duplication . . . [in] . . . existing
101
regulations . . . .

91. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Amendment (Invasive Species)
Bill, 2002 (Cth) (Austl.).
92. Id. at 19.
93. Id. at 7–11.
94. Id. at 30. The composition of the committee would have included representatives from
AQIS, non-governmental conservation organizations, members of the scientific community,
indigenous peoples, the commonwealth, the business community, and animal welfare groups. The
role of the committee would have been to advise the Minister on protection of native biodiversity
and agricultural commodities from IAS.
95. Id. at 23.
96. Id. at 30.
97. TURNING BACK THE TIDE, supra note 87, at xiii.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 200–02, 208.
100. Id. at 198.
101. Id. at 207.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

468

Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 35:453

This conclusion, which has not been revisited for almost a decade,
contrasts sharply with developments in the US, where coordination of
the IAS regime is now seen as a priority.
2. The United States of America
As already noted, the US has not ratified the CBD. Nevertheless, it
has still introduced a considerable volume of regulation that is
consistent with the principles of Article 8(h) of the CBD, which sets out
102
obligations with respect to IAS. To start with, the Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS) undertakes border controls, and a
program established within APHIS (the Plant Pest Program) is charged
with “safeguarding agriculture and natural resources from entry,
establishment, and spread of animal and plant pests and noxious
103
weeds.” APHIS operates in accordance with the Plant Protection Act
104
2000,
and under delegated authority from the United States
105
Department of Agriculture. Other legislation, such as the Aquatic
Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990, targets invasive species
106
107
of the aquatic environment. Elsewhere, the Lacey Act 1900 and the
108
Endangered Species Act 1973 can be used by regulators to deal with
IAS, although neither pieces of legislation are specifically designed to
target these species. The Lacey Act 1900 can assist with controlling the
transport of invasive species, while the Endangered Species Act 1973
can be invoked to protect endangered species where they are threatened
by IAS.
In addition to legislation, the US Federal government has
developed a number of policy instruments in the form of strategies and
plans designed to eradicate and control IAS. These include the 2004
National Strategy and Implementation Plan for Invasive Species
Management, which stresses the need for collaboration and
109
accountability in IAS regimes.
102. See U.N.E.P., supra note 1, ¶ (i).
103. Plant
Health,
Usda-Aphis,

(Nov.

30,

2011),

available

at

http://www.aphis.usda.gov/plant_healthHealth.
104. Plant Protection Act, 7 U.S.C. § 7701 (2000). See also History of APHIS, U.S. Dept. of
Agric. Animal and Plant Health Inspection (last visited Aug. 7, 2013),
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/about_aphis/history.shtml (providing further information on the
implementation of legislation).
105. Id. In addition, in September 2005, the USDA delegated authority to APHIS to
implement the Noxious Weed Control and Eradication Act.
106. Id.
107. Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (1900).
108. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (1973).
109. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Forest Serv., Nat’l Strategy and Implementation Plan for Invasive
Species
Mgmt.,
Invasive
Species,
3
(2004),
available
at
http://www.fs.fed.us/invasivespecies/documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 2012).
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Much regulation at the “grass roots” level is undertaken by the
States and Territories; and has been studied in detail by the
110
Environmental Law Institute (ELI). The ELI notes that many States
deal with “pest” species by way of listing processes: either “white” lists
to identify species that can be possessed and traded freely; or “black”
111
lists to enumerate prohibited species. The white lists effectively ban
the introduction of any species unless it is set out on the permitted list,
while the black lists freely allow the introduction, possession or sale of
112
species unless they have been explicitly deemed harmful and banned.
113
Most States in the US rely on black lists. Yet, one of the problems
with black lists is that they identify those species that have already
caused damage and can thus be classified as invasive. As such, black
lists do not necessarily deal with the potential of species to become
invasive. In addition, as has been noted in Australia, listing mechanisms
in general are ineffective to prevent the internal trade in declared
114
species.
Other than listing mechanisms, the United States has developed
strategies and management plans to deal with IAS; these regularly
highlight the need to coordinate activities and regimes. The Florida
Exotic Pest Plant Council, for example, has developed management
plans to deal with invasive species such as melaleucas, Brazilian pepper
115
and Chinese tallow; while Louisiana has introduced a comprehensive
116
plan to deal with aquatic IAS. The ELI has concluded that in many
cases, states have developed such plans in response to the need for
117
“cooperative regulation.” At the same time, the ELI has also noted
that difficulties inherent in drawing together such a vast range of
policies and measures have led to a system where:
invasive species from different taxa and ecosystems [are regulated]
in substantially different ways—aquatic species, wildlife, plants and
110. U.S. Dept. of Agric., Forest Serv., Nat’l Strategy and Implementation Plan for Invasive
SPECIES,
3
(2004),
available
at
Species
Mgmt.,
INVASIVE
http://www.fs.fed.us/invasivespecies/documents/Final_National_Strategy_100804.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 2012).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 17.
114. NATURAL RES. MGMT. MINISTERIAL COUNCIL, AUSTRALIAN GOV’T DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
FISHERIES AND FORESTRY, A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE MANAGEMENT OF ORNAMENTAL
FISH
IN
AUSTRALIA
8
(2006),
available
at
http://www.dpi.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/288425/Management-of-ornamental-fishin-Australia.pdf.
115. See FLORIDA EXOTIC PEST PLANT COUNCIL, (last updated June 4, 2013),
http://www.fleppc.org/publications.htmmanagement.
116. MARK MCELROY ET AL., STATE MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR AQUATIC INVASIVE SPECIES
IN LOUISIANA, LOUISIANA, DEP’T OF WILDLIFE AND FISHERIES (2005), available at
http://is.cbr.tulane.edu/docs_IS/Louisiana-AIS-Mgt-Plan.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012).
117. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 16.
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plant pests are regulated through entirely separate mechanisms by
agencies that place different priorities on and use different strategies
118
to address invasive species.

These were the types of challenges that prompted President
Clinton to declare Executive Order 13112. As already noted, this order
applies directly to Federal agencies and requires them to cooperate in
preventing harm from IAS. The order also sets up the National Invasive
Species Council (NISC) and the Invasive Species Advisory Committee
119
(ISAC). The NISC provides guidance to Federal administrators and
regulators on IAS regulation and also coordinates IAS measures across
120
a range of “state, tribal and local” stakeholders.
The ISAC is
comprised of experts and other interested parties who are not affiliated
with Federal departments or agencies. It meets at least twice a year and
121
provides advice to the NISC.
The catchphrase of the NISC is “Prepare, Prevent, Protect” and
these ideals are reflected in the management plans that guide the
operations of the NISC. The first plan, titled “Meeting the Invasive
Species Challenge Management Plan,” was introduced in 2001 and
acknowledged that the primary role of the NISC was to provide
122
“national leadership and oversight” on invasive species.
This
objective is still important to the operation of the second management
plan, the “2008-2012 National Invasive Species Management Plan”
123
(2008 NISC Plan).
The 2008 NISC Plan is based on five strategic goals: Prevention;
Early Detection and Rapid Response; Control and Management;
124
Restoration; and Organizational Collaboration.
The fifth goal,
organizational collaboration, particularly targets coordination of
activities by stressing the importance of maximizing “organizational
effectiveness and collaboration on invasive species issues among
international, Federal, state local and tribal governments, private
125
organizations and individuals.”
Given the fact that Executive Order 13112 does not endow the
NISC with legal authority to compel agencies to take particular action,
118. Id. at 15.
119. Executive Order No 13112, supra note 49, at §§ 3(a)–(b).
120. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL, MEETING THE INVASIVE SPECIES CHALLENGE,
MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (2001).
121. The Charter of the U.S. Department of the Interior Invasive Species Advisory
Committee,
available
at
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/global/ISAC/ISAC_documents/ISAC_Charter_2010.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 2012).
122. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at 3.
123. Id. at 28.
124. Id. at 5–6.
125. Id. at 28.
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126

or to re-organize departments, its remit is ambitious. The concept of
coordination, for example, which is inherent in the notion of
organizational collaboration, not only includes coordination of activities
between the Federal government and other levels of government, but
also includes coordination of activities amongst Federal agencies and
departments themselves. In accordance with the 2008 NISC Plan, these
activities are to be evaluated against eighty-seven performance targets,
127
involving some thirty-five departments and agencies.
An important aspect of the NISC’s leadership flows from its ability
to conduct evaluations across Federal departments and agencies. In this
regard, the NISC management plan “not only serves as a framework for
overall priorities, but also sets ballpark performance indicators for
128
evaluating success.” As part of the evaluation process, the NISC also
collects budget information on agency spending related to invasive
species. This allows continuous overview of the Federal government’s
129
operations in a strategic way.
A further initiative is the special category of funding proffered by
the Federal government for research into IAS, administered under the
auspices of the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). These
grants provide a starting point for stakeholders researching IAS to apply
130
for funding. One successful example of the funding process is drawn
from the design of management plans for the control of aquatic IAS. In
addition to the regulation of aquatic IAS, a number of states have used
the same plans as a platform from which to evaluate their terrestrial
131
IAS. In these cases, the funding has become value-added, as the
projects promote appraisal of IAS regulation that extends beyond the
initial scope of the funds. While these developments are positive, the
funding process has nevertheless received its share of criticism. The
ELI, for example, notes that the funding streams operate inconsistently
and do not support state IAS regimes in as effective a manner as
132
possible.
The most striking feature of the operation of the NISC is the
126. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), FIVE-YEAR REVIEW OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER
13112
ON
INVASIVE
SPECIES
10
(2005),
available
at
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/home_documents/Five-Year%20ReviewFINAL%20PRINT%20VERSION.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL
(NISC)].
127. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at 5.
128. Discussion with Stanley Burgiel, NISC, in Wash., D.C. (Oct. 2010).
129. Id.
130. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., GRANT AND PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS THAT CAN
ADDRESS INVASIVE SPECIES RESEARCH, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, PREVENTION AND CONTROLFEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2012 2, 17 (2011).
131. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 10.
132. Id. at 9–10.
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importance that the Federal government attaches to the coordination of
IAS-related activities. Against this backdrop, leadership by Federal
authorities is the crucial linchpin. Accordingly, the NISC draws on its
strengths, which includes the ability to offer a high-level forum for
stakeholders to exchange information, and to discuss and settle mutually
133
beneficial goals and objectives. Meetings of the NISC have thus
played an important role in shaping uniform policy for the regulation of
IAS. Indeed, dialogue and consultation are seen as so vital that,
although the NISC’s principal goal is coordination across Federal
agencies, collaboration with other entities is an important, if secondary,
function. Thus, beyond domestic regulation, the NISC sponsored
regional workshops that included participants such as the Global
134
Invasive Species Program (GISP). Although the GISP was closed at
the end of March 2011, such cooperation is still regarded as
135
important.
Such cooperation is regarded as important to building
knowledge and sharing techniques and technology for stopping the
introduction and spread of IAS, especially among regional trading
partners.
Another significant achievement of the NISC has been the
establishment of an online information portal, the National Invasive
Species Information Centre, which the NISC has achieved with the
assistance of the United States Department of Agriculture and the
136
National Agricultural Library. The portal links online information
and the websites of government departments and agencies as well as
137
non-government groups. As such, it facilitates dialogue on IAS across
a range of government and non-government agencies. For example, it
allows regulators, researchers and community groups to determine
whether they are working towards the same goals and objectives and
also facilitates scrutiny of regulatory processes for consistency and
acceptance by stakeholders. In so doing, the NISC has become a hub for
the dissemination of information as well as for encouraging the
development of harmonised regulatory objectives for IAS.
This is not to say that the NISC has been a panacea for meeting the
IAS challenge in the US. The activities and effectiveness of the NISC

133. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 9, 10.
134. Id. at 2, 14. GISP was the Global Invasive Species Programme. It was an international
organization that was formed in 1997 to develop best practices to control IAS on a global scale.
The institution closed on 31 March 2011. See Closure of the Global Invasive Species Programme
(GISP), BOTANIC GARDENS CONSERVATION INT’L (last visited Mar. 2011),
http://www.bgci.org/resources/news/0794.
135. Id.
136. See NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES INFO. CTR. (NISIC), http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov
(last visited Nov. 2012).
137. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 2.
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138

are regularly reviewed and a 2003 review indicated that the NISC had
139
only met a small proportion of its goals. Yet this conclusion still
needs to be understood in context. In particular, before the
establishment of the NISC, the US lacked an overarching coordination
mechanism for the regulation of IAS. As already noted, the NISC was
charged with an ambitious remit and the achievement of a large number
of goals and objectives. This meant that the NISC had much ground to
cover, especially in its early years. Moreover, the NISC operates within
the confines of the constitutional powers of the Federal government.
Accordingly, the NISC does not exercise legal authority across the
board. Indeed, notwithstanding these challenges, as the Five-Year
Review of Executive Order 13112 on Invasive Species notes, the NISC
140
has chalked up an impressive track record. In an analogous manner,
the collaborative approaches of the NISC and its emphasis on
coordination of activities are also acknowledged as important in
jurisdictions such as GB.
3. Great Britain
As with Australia and the US, the IAS regime in GB consists of a
mix of border controls and internal regulation. Again, with similarity to
Australia and the US, the latter includes a combination of policy and
legislative instruments.
Border Controls in GB are maintained by the Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and are shaped by EU
directives aimed at preventing the introduction and spread of pests and
diseases. By way of example, EC Plant Health Directive
141
(2000/29/EC) has been implemented in GB by means of Secondary
legislation, including the Plant Health (England) Order 2005, the Plant
Health (Wales) Order 2006, and the Plant Health (Scotland) Order
142
2005. Other legislation prohibits the importation of “non-indigenous
143
mammalian species” with destructive habits. Permanent Orders have
been made banning some species such as musk rats, grey squirrels, and

138. See, e.g., Federal Efforts and State Perspectives on Challenges and National
at
Leadership, U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF. (June 2003), available
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03916t.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012); NATIONAL INVASIVE
SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 13.
139. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 138, at 2.
140. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 2.
141. Council Directive 2000/29 (EC), Protective Measures Against the Introduction into the
Community of Organisms Harmful to Plants or Plant Products and Against their Spread within
the Community, 2000 O.J. (L 169) 1.
142. See HELEN LONG ET AL., GUIDELINES ON LEGISLATION, IMPORT, PRACTICES AND
QUARANTINE FOR BOTANIC GARDENS AND KINDRED INSTITUTIONS 4 (Judith Cheney ed., 2006).
143. Destructive Imported Animals Act, 1932, 22 Geo. 5, c. 12, §10 (Eng.).
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non-indigenous rabbits.144
Apart from border controls, for many years, section 14 of the
Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 was the main legislative instrument
dealing with IAS in GB.145 The section initially created offences with
respect to keeping or releasing prohibited species listed in schedule 9 of
the Act, otherwise known as the “Keeling Schedule.” Offences
included: allowing listed animals which were not ordinarily resident in,
or a regular visitor to GB, to escape into the wild; releasing these
animals into the wild; allowing such animals to escape from captivity;
146
and, planting or causing a listed plant to grow in the wild. Regulation
was thus based on a “black list” approach, which is similar to the
systems established in Australia and the US.
Over the years, section 14 was amended on an ad hoc basis, either
to comply with European Union directives, or to fulfil recommendations
following internal reviews of non-native species. For example, the
147
section was amended to give effect to the Wild Birds Directive and
148
the Habitats Directive, which require members to prevent and control
the introduction of invasive non-native species. The Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 was further amended in 2004 following a review
149
of non-native species policy in 2001.
st
By the beginning of the 21 century the focus of regulation had
begun to shift towards governance issues. In 2006, for example,
DEFRA commissioned an audit into governance structures for nonnative species.150 The audit concluded that 101 “business units” were
charged with responsibilities relating to non-native species.151 In some
cases, business units comprised entire departments, while in other cases
144. Musk Rats Act 1933 (S.I. No. 199/1965) (Ir.); Grey Squirrels (Prohibition of
Importation and Keeping) Order, 1937, SI 1937/478 (N. Ir. 478), art. 1; The Non-Indigenous
Rabbits (Prohibition of Importation and Keeping) Order, 1954, SI 1954/927 (N. Ir. 927), art. 2.
145. The Wildlife & Countryside Act 1981, WILD BIRDS AND THE LAW,
http://www.rspb.org.uk/ourwork/policy/wildbirdslaw/birdsandlaw/wca/ (last visited Apr. 13,
2013). Section 14 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 created offences if a person released
an animal or allowed it to escape in circumstances where the animal “is not an ordinarily resident
in and is not a regular visitor to Great Britain in a wild state.” See Wildlife and Countryside Act,
1981, c. 69, available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/69/contents.
146. Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, c. 69, §§ 14 (1)(A), (14), (2).
147. Council Directive 79/409 (EC), Conservation of Wild Birds, Directive 1979 O.J. (L.
103) 1.
148. Council Directive 92/43 (EC), Conservation of Natural Habitats and of Wild Fauna and
Flora, 1992 O.J. (L 206).
149. The amending regulations were: The Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 (England and
Wales) (Amendment) Regulations 2004, and the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981
(Amendment) (Wales) Regulations 2004. For a short discussion, see Matthew Fasham and Kate
Trumper, Review of Non-Native Species Legislation and Guidance, DEFRA (2001), available at
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-pets/wildlife/management/non-native/documents/reviewreport.pdf (last visited Nov. 2012).
150. NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 6.
151. Id.
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they comprised portions of departments or executive agencies. The
audit concluded that the IAS regime in GB needed “greater strategic
153
cohesion and a clearer sense of common goals.” This finding was
consistent with a policy review in 2003 that recommended that “[t]he
Government should designate or create a single lead co-ordinating
organisation to undertake the role of co-ordinating and ensuring
consistency of application of non-native species policies across
154
Government.” A peak body was thus seen as vital to drawing together
the various components of the IAS regime.
The synthesised conclusions and recommendations from these
instruments were integrated into the Invasive Non-Native Species
Framework Strategy for Great Britain (GB Non-Native Species
155
Strategy).
This Strategy emphasized the need for effective
coordination of policy and measures across the entire IAS regime, and
in particular for the establishment of a coherent and proportionate
156
legislative framework.
In furtherance of this objective, the
government established the GB Non-native Species Coordination
Mechanism, which strengthens initiatives established prior to the release
of the 2008 GB Non-Native Species Strategy and also introduces a
157
number of new initiatives.
The Coordination Mechanism itself
consists of the Non-Native Species Programme Board, the Non-Native
Species Secretariat (NNSS), the Risk Analysis Panel, the Stakeholder
158
Forum and a number of Working Groups.
159
The Non-Native Species Programme Board was established in
2005 and comprises senior representatives of government agencies from
England, Scotland, and Wales. The role of the Programme Board
includes the development and implementation of the GB Non-Native
Species Strategy and the determination of priorities for IAS regulation.
The Programme Board also runs the annual Stakeholder Forum, which
provides an opportunity for discussion, debate and awareness of
160
emerging IAS issues.
The Non-Native Species Secretariat was
established in 2006 to support the Programme Board; and additionally,
provides an avenue for communication between the Board and

152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at 6.
Id.at 21–22.
Id. at 32.
DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, THE INVASIVE NON-NATIVE SPECIES
FRAMEWORK STRATEGY FOR GREAT BRITAIN 34 (2008).
156. Id. at 24.
NON-NATIVE
SPECIES
COORDINATION
MECHANISM,
157. GB
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/home/index.cfm (last visited Nov. 2012).
158. Id.
159. NON-NATIVE SPECIES FRAMEWORK, supra note 10, at 34.
160. Id. at 35.
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161

stakeholders.
The Non-Native Species Risk Analysis Panel will
undertake risk assessment and “horizon scanning” with respect to the
162
introduction of alien species. The reports of the Non-Native Species
Risk Analysis Panel will guide the operation of the Programme Board.
In tandem with these initiatives, the Scottish government also
embarked on a program to update its IAS regulation. Prior to 2011, IAS
in Scotland were largely governed by the Wildlife and Countryside Act
1981 that applied throughout GB. Following devolution of legislative
authority over Scotland in 1998, however, the Scottish government
began introducing more targeted IAS regulation, including: the Nature
163
Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004; and the Salmon and Freshwater
164
Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003.
The most far-reaching changes, however, stem from the passing of
the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 that
extensively amended the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 as it
applied in Scotland. The explanatory memorandum to the Wildlife and
Natural Environment (Scotland) Bill (SP Bill 52) (EM) notes that laws
to regulate the keeping of all “potential high-risk invasive animals and
165
plants” were not reflected in Scotland’s IAS regime.
Proposed
measures, however, would need to be proportionate to risks. Hence,
banning all known invasive species would be disproportionate if the
166
risks they pose are minor.
Significantly, the EM notes that basing legislation on “black lists”
of declared or prohibited species, as occurred under the Keeling
Schedule of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, is
counterproductive because such species will generally be listed once
167
they have proved to be invasive. Accordingly, the legislation is based
on a “general no-release approach” intended to operate as a preventative
mechanism to stop people from releasing or growing “potentially
161. Id. at 34.
162. For example, Schedule 6 of the Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004 and section 50
of the Natural Environment and Rural Communities NERC Act 2006 amend the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981 to enhance environmental protection from non-native species; FOOD AND
RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 34; Non-Native Risk Analysis Panel, NON-NATIVE SPECIES
SECRETARIAT
(Nov.
2012),
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/index.cfm?pageid=51 (last visited Nov. 2012).
163. Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, section 11, amended, among other things,
section 14 of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 by introducing a new definition of nonnative. Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act, 2004, (A.S.P. 6), 69, 14.
164. Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 2003, (A.S.P. 15),
which came into force in 2008, introduced § 33, which makes it an offence to introduce live fish
or spawn, intentionally into inland waters, without a permit.
165. Policy Memorandum (Scotland), Wildlife and Natural Environment, SP Bill 52, part 2
(Donnelly 2010) [hereinafter Policy Memorandum].
166. Id. ¶ 106.
167. Id. ¶ 103.
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harmful animals or plants’ plants” that could become established in the
168
wild.
Notwithstanding this policy objective, authorities have power in
accordance with Section 14(1) of the Wildlife and Natural Environment
(Scotland) Act 2011 to create lists of prohibited species where the
169
threats the species pose are not minor. As the EM notes, however, the
legislation is intended to operate without a detailed list of banned
species; and banning orders will only be used where crucial, and even
170
then, only after consultation with stakeholders. Where banning orders
have been made, the legislation prohibits those species from being sold
171
or offered for sale. The Minister can also exempt species through
legislation, and exemptions have been made for pheasants and
172
partridges that are released for game hunting.
To support the no-release policy, the legislation creates a range of
offences including: allowing an animal to escape from captivity beyond
173
its native range, and planting or causing a plant to grow in the wild
174
beyond its native range. The notion of a “native range” refers to the
175
locality to which the animal or plant is indigenous.
As such, it
excludes localities where the animal or plant has been introduced.
Moreover, the term does not automatically refer to an entire political or
administrative unit, such as the whole of Scotland. Accordingly, the
drafters of the legislation evince regulatory acknowledgement that a
“native” species can be just as destructive as an alien species if it is
introduced outside its native range.
In accordance with section 14C of the Wildlife and Natural
Environment (Scotland) Act 2011, the Minister may settle on a code of
practice that provides practical guidance with respect to activities that
would otherwise be deemed an offence. This allows a person adhering
176
to the code to take advantage of specified defences. For example,
some animals such as falcons and other raptors may be released
temporarily and the codes could provide guidance on how such species

168. Id. ¶¶ 69, 79, 86, 105.
169. Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland), 2011, (A.S.P. 6). §§ 14(1)(a)(ii),
14(2)(b)(1).
170. Policy Memorandum 52, supra note 165, ¶ 86.
171. Wildlife and Natural Environment Act, supra note 169, § 14A(1).
172. Id. § 14(2A)(a)(b).
173. Id. §§ 14(1)(a)(i), 14(1)(b).
174. Id. § 14(2).
175. Id.
176. These relate to the following sections of the Wildlife and Natural Environment
(Scotland) Act 2011: § 14 (release of non-native species), § 14C (offences for banned species), §
14A (prohibition on sale and other dealings of invasive species) and § 14B (notification of the
presence of invasive species).
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still remain under control for the purposes of the legislation.
Finally, the Scottish Minister may notify persons, such as property
managers, and those in a professional capacity of the presence of
178
invasive plants and animals. These notifications channel into rapid
response mechanisms designed to prevent IAS from escalating from a
comparatively small problem into a more widespread one. To this
effect, s14D states that “relevant bodies” may make a species control
179
order with respect to invasive plants and animals.
A “relevant body”
includes Scottish Ministers, the Scottish Natural Heritage, the Scottish
180
Environment Protection Agency and the Forestry Commission.
The Scottish legislature has thus placed its IAS regulation under
the umbrella of a robust and unifying statute. If successful, there is
potential for identical or similar legislation to be introduced in other
jurisdictions in GB. This uniform approach to IAS regulation, however,
is not the norm elsewhere. For example, in Australia and the US, the
quality and effectiveness of IAS measures, and ultimately the regime
itself, varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Even regulation within the
same level of government is plagued by gaps, inconsistencies and areas
of overlap. The key issue for the purposes of this paper is whether peak
coordinating bodies are a feasible means of drawing together many
components to create a “whole” IAS regime that is greater than the sum
of its individual laws and regulations.
IV. THE WHOLE VS. THE SUM OF ITS PARTS
The US and GB have sought to effect coordination by establishing
peak institutions consisting respectively of the National Invasive
Species Council and the Non-Native Species Secretariat. Although these
bodies are established in differing political and legal systems, the NISC
and NNSS share similarities stemming from the role they play and the
tacit understanding that their operation will lead to transformation and
improved regulation.
Each body is designed to provide guidance and leadership, but not
to have wide-ranging legal powers to impose homogenous regulations
on the spectrum of agencies, departments and jurisdictions across the
181
different levels of government. Accordingly, the backbone of these
177. Policy Memorandum, supra note 165, ¶ 81. At the time of writing, the government had
released a code of practice detailing how the legislation in general is to operate. See Non-Native
Species
Code
of
Practice
(2012),
available
at
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/08/7367/0 (made by the Scottish Ministers under
Section 14C of the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981).
178. Policy Memorandum, supra note 165, at § 14C.
179. Wildlife and Natural Environment Act, supra note 169, §14D.
180. Id. at § 14P(6).
NATIONAL
INVASIVE
SPECIES
COUNCIL,
181. See
generally
THE
http://www.invasivespecies.gov/main_nav/mn_about.html (last visited. Mar. 15, 2013).
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bodies lies in their ability to draw the IAS regime together by
coordinating the diverse responses to IAS. Common coordinating
mechanisms include: the promotion of unified policy-making; the use of
broad-based advisory bodies; the use of an overarching definition of an
IAS; and the provision of services such as a one-stop information portal.
1. Unified Policy
Policy may be described as “a set of principles and intentions used
182
to guide decision making.” As with other areas of regulation, it is an
important tool for formulating effective environmental regimes because
it draws together social, economic, environmental and scientific
183
considerations. In the context of IAS, policy shapes how regulators
set the parameters of regulation by determining which species are
subject to measures, as well as how regulators determine optimal
governance arrangements. The latter are particularly crucial where
regulation is spread across a multiplicity of sectors, compelling
regulators to make value-based decisions on how to deal with
competing interests.
The policy approaches of Australia, the UK and the USA are found
in a range of agreements, orders, statements, action plans and strategies
that all acknowledge the importance of coordination to the success of
IAS regimes. In Australia, for example, principle 6 of the Australian
Pest Animal Strategy—A National Strategy for the Management of
Vertebrate Pest Animals in Australia notes that “[p]est animal
management requires coordination among all levels of government in
partnership with industry, land and water managers and the community,
184
185
regardless of land tenure.” Similar policy statements in GB and the
186
US
also stress the need for collaboration, communication, and
187
“procedural streamlining.”
Notwithstanding general consensus for a coordinated response to
IAS regulation, the Australian regime still remains fragmented,
incomplete and lacking in effective leadership. In the Senate Invasive
182. JANE ROBERTS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 2 (1st ed. 2010).
183. Id. at 2–3.
184. NRMMC, supra note 75; see also Natural Heritage Trust, Australian Emergency Marine
Pest Plan EMPPlan: Control Centres Management Manual, NAT. HERITAGE TRUST (2005),
available
at
http://www.marinepests.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/526283/EMPPlan_web_version_16_
Oct_06_2.pdf (Working Draft). For a discussion on the protection of marine environment and the
effectiveness of the national framework, see generally Ian Peebles, Towards A National
Emergency Management Framework For Marine Bio-Invasions, 19 AUSTL. J. OF EMERGENCY
MGMT. 50 (2004).
185. FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 8.
186. See generally Exec. Order No. 13112, supra note 49 (establishing the Invasive Species
Council); see also, NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at 5.
187. See NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120, at ii.
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Species Inquiry, the Australian Senate noted that the Federal
government needed to “strengthen its leadership role in the national
effort to combat invasive species by developing a robust national
framework, in consultation with State, Territory and local governments,
188
to regulate, control and manage invasive species”
The need for greater Federal leadership was also stressed
189
elsewhere in the report. Yet, one of the perceived drawbacks of the
IAS Bill is that it was predicated on strengthened Federal legislative
powers;190 and as already noted, the Senate was concerned at the
potential for this to destabilize the balance of power in Australia’s
system of government.191
The use of legislation to impose uniform or coordinated regulation,
however, is just one way of drawing the IAS regime together. Shine,
Williams, and Gündling have identified three models for coordinating
IAS regimes, and only the first model depends on centralised and robust
192
legal processes that can override State and Territory jurisdictions.
This model, described as a “unitary legislative framework,” stands in
contrast to the second and third models that involve decreasing degrees
of central control.193 The second model, for example, consists of
establishing a coordinating body with authority to harmonise aims,
methods and processes, but with a lesser concentration of power than
194
the first model. The third option comprises a coordinating body that
does not have legal authority to impose uniform or harmonised IAS
measures.195 Instead, that body largely functions on political
persuasion.196 At the same time, the second and third models are still
197
reliant on a central government taking a leadership role.
The NISC, for example, appears to be based on the third model.198
Although it has power to direct Federal agencies, it does not have
authority to overrule State and territory agencies.199 In the latter, its role
is to guide regimes using soft techniques.200 Accordingly, the NISC
neither dismantles institutions already established by the states and
territories, nor encroaches on state and territory jurisdiction.201 Instead,
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

TURNING BACK THE TIDE, supra note 87, at v.
Id. ¶ 8.13.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 6.15, 6.26, 7.27, 7.29.
SHINE, supra note 3, ¶ 4.3.4.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT PLAN, supra note 120.
See id. at 9, 28.
See id. at 7.
See id.

10/16/2013 10:58 AM

2013]

Peak Coordinating Bodies and Invasive Alien Species

481

the NISC exerts its influence by acting as a coordinating role-model.202
Indeed, fostering a unified policy-base is one of the key features of peak
bodies and in the US, the NISC has been able to consider the “big
203
picture” and identify “trends in invasions” influencing state regimes.
2. Advisory Panels and Committees
In the US, the Invasive Species Advisory Committee (ISAC) is
204
constituted as an advisory body to assist the NISC. In accordance
with its charter, membership of the ISAC is widely drawn and includes
educators, biologists, lawyers, representatives from industry, tribal
representatives, economists and representatives from non-government
205
organisations.
This range provides the ISAC with considerable
expertise, allowing the views of the Committee to be representative in
the broadest possible sense. To encourage stakeholder engagement,
meetings of ISAC are open to the public and the minutes of meetings
are also available for public scrutiny.206 Advisory bodies, however, are
not fool proof. Their membership needs to be truly representative to
207
avoid accusations of bias. Nevertheless, if properly constituted, they
do provide opportunities for public input and discussion that enhances
the effectiveness of regulation.208
Neither Australia nor the UK has a comparable advisory body,
although each has committees and panels that act in an advice-giving
capacity with respect to parts of the IAS problem. In Australia, for
209
example, the Threatened Species Scientific Committee (TSSC), is
constituted in accordance with the EPBC Act and provides advice on
the listing of threatening processes, including the impacts of IAS, as
well as advising with respect to the adoption of threat abatement plans.
In the case of weeds, the Australian Weeds Committee (AWC) was
210
established as a governmental forum to resolve weeds issues. Neither
the TSSC, nor the AWC, however, are as widely representative as the
ISAC,—either in terms of composition of committee members or in
202. Id. at 28.
203. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 20.
204. The Charter of the U.S. Department of the Interior Invasive Species Advisory
Committee, supra note 120, at 4.
205. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, at 12.
206. Id. at 15.
207. Daniel E. Walters, The Justiciability of Fair Balance Under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act: Toward a Deliberative Process Approach, 110 MICH. L. REV. 677, 679–80
(2011-2012). Another example of a truly representative body is the Aquatic Nuisance Species
Task Force (ANSTF) that includes representatives from federal agencies, state departments, and
regional panels.
208. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9, ¶ 15.
209. EPBC Act §§ 502 and 503 establish the Threatened Species Scientific Committee.
210. AUSTRALIAN WEEDS COMMITTEE, available at http://www.weeds.org.au/awc.htm (last
visited Nov. 2012).
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211

their sphere of activity. This is not surprising as neither committee
was designed to deal with IAS at large, nor intended as a forum for
engaging with the public and other stakeholders.
Although the UK has not established a comparable body to the
ISAC, it has initiated the GB Non-native Species Coordination
Mechanism, which, as already discussed, includes a secretariat, the
Non-Native Species Programme Board and the Stakeholder Forum.
Recall that the Programme Board directs the secretariat, while the
Stakeholder Forum engages with government, industry and the
community. Combined, these two panels perform a similar function to
the ISAC, especially with respect to oversight of country-wide
coordination mechanisms that encourage stakeholder input.
Two features set the US and UK regimes apart from the Australian
one. First, the US and UK processes cover the range of IAS, while the
Australian system is fragmented and piece-meal with insufficient
unifying elements. Undoubtedly, the committees established in
Australia do a great deal of good work within their own disciplines.
They, however, are not coordinating bodies because they do not bring
the regime together in a cohesive manner. No agency, for example, sees
the “big picture.” Second, the Australian system lacks comprehensive
means for engaging stakeholders at the Federal level. This is at least
partly due to the absence of advisory and consultative panels with
widely-drawn membership that would otherwise provide a forum for
open discussion and community consultation. A further and related
drawback of the Australian regime is the lack of uniform terminology,
which makes it difficult for stakeholders to be clear about primary goals
and objectives.
3. Uniform Definition
Adopting a uniform definition of an IAS is perhaps one of the most
significant features of coordinating mechanisms. Governments are often
faced with competing views and values that determine whether species
should be treated as IAS. This situation can be particularly problematic
in formulating policy and regulation where one person’s IAS is

211. In accordance with §§ 502 and 503 of the EPBC Act, the Minister determines the
qualifications and appoints the members of the Threatened Species Scientific Committee. The
members have traditionally been drawn from a science background. Membership of the
Australian Weeds Committee is drawn from government departments, including the Department
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry as well as the Department of Sustainability, Environment,
Water, Population and Communities. Other agencies, such as Plant Health Australia, have been
granted observer status. See Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and
available
at
Communities,
Roles
and
Responsibilities
(Austl.),
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/weeds/government/roles/index.html.
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212

another’s resource.
Definitions are thus crucial in guiding the
operations of regimes by setting parameters and triggers for regulation.
In the US, the Executive Order on IAS defines an IAS as a species
that is not native to an ecosystem and whose “introduction does or is
likely to cause economic or environmental harm or harm to human
213
health.” This definition adopts an ecosystem approach to regulation
and contrasts with implementation of regimes that often correspond to
local government, territory or state boundaries. Using ecosystem
parameters is important because it brings the fact that administrative
boundaries rarely coincide with ecological ones to the forefront, and
214
allows regulation to be formulated accordingly.
In a similar manner, the GB Framework defines a “non-native
species” (NNS) as “the equivalent of ‘Alien species’ as used by the
215
Convention on Biological Diversity.” Within the CBD, the Guiding
Principles for the Prevention, Introduction and Mitigation of Impacts of
Alien Species that Threaten Ecosystems, Habitats or Species (CBD
Guiding Principles) define an alien species as one that has been
216
introduced outside its natural past or present distribution. Invasive
non-native species, which are the equivalent of IAS, are broadly defined
as species whose “introduction and/or spread threaten biological
217
diversity or have other unforseen impacts.” Although the CBD and
GB Framework each use different phrases, the salient point when
defining an IAS and an NNS is that both focus on ecological rather than
administrative parameters. Accordingly, a species moved from one part
of a country to another is not automatically classified as a native
species. A similar policy approach has been taken in Scotland, where, as
already discussed, the Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act
218
2011 Act defines native species in terms of their indigenous range.
By way of contrast, Australia does not enjoy the benefit of an
219
ecologically-based definition of an IAS. The EPBC Act, the main
legislation regulating the protection of biodiversity at the Federal level,
defines a “native species” as one that was present in Australia, or an
212. RICHARD GROVES, ROBERT BODEN & MARK LONSDALE, JUMPING THE GARDEN
FENCE: INVASIVE PLANTS IN AUSTRALIA AND THEIR ENVIRONMENTAL AND AGRICULTURAL
IMPACTS 29 (2005).
213. Exec. Order No. 13112, supra note 49.
214. A. Morrison, Management of Introduced Species in the Murray-Darling Basin – A
Discussion Paper, Murray-Darling Basin Commission Proceedings of the Workshop on Native
Fish Management Murray-Darling Basin Commission Canberra 149 (1989); P. L. Shafland and
W. M. Lewis, Terminology Associated With Introduced Organism (1984) 9 (4) Fisheries 17, 18.
215. DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 8.
216. U.N.E.P., supra note 1, at 257.
217. DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at page 8.
218. Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act, 2011, (A.S.P. 6), § 14P(2).
219. Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 2011 (Cth) vol. 2, § 528
(Austrl.).
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external Territory, before 1400.
This temporal definition that
nominates a cut-off date is useful for administrative purposes, but lacks
the functional competence of ecologically-based definitions. In
particular, it does not evince recognition that a native species can
become invasive if introduced beyond its native range.
The one attempt at introducing a uniform definition for IAS in
Australia pursuant to the Invasive Species Bill 2002 was
221
unsuccessful.
Similar to other provisions of the Bill, the Senate
Invasive Species Inquiry considered an overarching definition
222
unnecessary, as it would duplicate existing processes. Yet Australia
does not enjoy the benefit of a prime definition for an IAS. At the same
time, jurisdictions in the US, GB and Scotland demonstrate that there
are many ways of integrating such definitions into IAS practice. It is
significant, for example, that the definition found in section 14P of the
Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act 2011 applies to one
political unit, namely Scotland.223 By way of contrast, the national
definitions found in the US and GB apply co-extensively to many
different levels of government. Accordingly, these national definitions
do not operate from a legislative base, which could otherwise
potentially override or invalidate regulation found in those other
jurisdictions. In this way, the US and GB approaches do not trespass
against constitutional balances of power. Rather, they comprise part of a
suite of coordination mechanisms that include other initiatives, such as
the creation of information portals.
4. Information Portals
The establishment of one-stop information portals, accessible via
the Internet, is a key feature of the IAS regimes in the US and GB. In
GB, the GB Non-native Species Coordination Mechanism is in the
224
process of establishing the “Non-Native Species Information Portal”;
while in the US, the National Invasive Species Council was
instrumental in launching the National Invasive Species Information
Centre (NISIC) in 2005.225 The Information Centre operates under the
auspices of the National Agricultural Library, although the NISIC
creates and manages the online information.226
220. Id.
221. Invasive Species Bill 2002 § 226AB(1)(a) (Cth) (Austl.).
222. TURNING BACK THE TIDE, supra note 87, ¶ 7.20.
223. Wildlife and Natural Environment (Scotland) Act, supra note 218.
224. See GB NON-NATIVE SPECIES INFORMATIONAL PORTAL, available at
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/nonnativespecies/factsheet/index (last visited Nov. 2012)
[hereinafter GB Portal].
225 NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES INFO. CTR. (NISIC), http://www.invasivespeciesinfo.gov/ (last
visited Nov. 2012).
226. Id.
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Information portals serve as gateways for holding data and making
it available to stakeholders in a readily accessible manner. As The
National Biodiversity Network in GB has noted:
[A]lthough a huge amount of information exists, it isn’t always easy
to access. The National Biodiversity Network (NBN) idea could not
be simpler: capture wildlife data once in a standard electronic form;
integrate data from different sources; and use the internet to enable
data to be used many times in different ways by as many people as
227
possible.

Given that one of the strengths of peak bodies lies in their strategic
approach to regulation, it is important that they be able to access and
share data as effectively as possible. The NISIC, for example, acts as a
gateway, linking information and data at the individual, local, regional,
national and international levels. The Non-Native Species Information
228
Portal in GB is being established with similar expectations.
Australia lacks a comparable information portal. Currently,
information on IAS is gathered and held by numerous agencies and
organizations, which provide information gateways for specific IAS
229
230
such as weeds
or feral animals.
This information, however, is
located at separate electronic sites and lacks the cohesiveness of a onestop portal. Non-government organisations (NGOs), such as the
Invasive Species Council, have also established websites to provide
231
information and up-to-date material.
Yet, it is unrealistic to expect
NGOs to fund the construction and upkeep of dedicated information
portals for an entire regime and for the whole country. Arguably, the
lack of dedicated information systems in Australia flows from the
absence of a peak body to oversee the regime. For example, it is no
coincidence that information portals in the US and GB were, or are,
being established under the auspices of PCBs. While this is one positive
argument in favor of peak bodies, a further consideration is whether
peak bodies are the most appropriate way to coordinate the regulation of
IAS.
5. Are Peak Bodies the “Best” Model?
To address this question, at least three matters need to be
considered: first, whether peak bodies in general are the most effective
227. The National Biodiversity Network, NBN, www.nbn.org.uk (last visited Nov. 2012).
228. See GB Portal, supra note 224.
229. WEEDS NAT’L SIGNIFICANCE, http://www.weeds.org.au/WoNS (last visited Nov. 2012).
230. FERAL
ANIMALS
AUSTRL.,
http://www.environment.gov.au/biodiversity/invasive/ferals/index.html (last visited Nov. 2012).
231. The Invasive Species Council is a non-government organization in Australia. INVASIVE
SPECIES COUNCIL, http://www.invasives.org.au (last visited Nov. 2012).
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way to “solve” coordination problems; second, whether peak bodies are
the best way of engaging with stakeholders; and third, whether peak
bodies disrupt Federal-state and/or constitutional arrangements.
From the discussion thus far, it is clear that one of the major
challenges to designing and implementing effective IAS regimes stems
from the need to adopt coordinated, if not uniform, approaches to IAS.
Where measures are designed and implemented across multiple layers
and levels of government, regulation in one jurisdiction will often be
ineffective without cooperation and collaboration by other jurisdictions.
In the US, for example, the Environmental Law Institute has
concluded that:
each state government has evolved a unique complex web of
authorities to enable it to address different types of invasive species
and different invasion pathways. . . . [F]ew states address all
pathways and because invasive species reproduce, spread and are
often moved by people, each state is hindered or helped by the
quality of neighbouring states’ laws. As a result, state and local
efforts depend on effective interstate collaboration and on Federal
232
help.

Even within the same level of government, the need for
coordinated efforts is underscored by the myriad of laws, departments
and agencies that touch upon IAS regulation. Again, in the US, the
NISC has noted that with respect to Federal laws:
[I]nvasive species coordination is complex and dynamic,
encompassing 25 Federal laws that address invasive species issues,
which govern the activities of over 40 agencies and many more
programs. In addition, NISC staff members estimate about 300 nonFederal programs, 175 organizations, and 140 groups have at least
233
some involvement with invasive species issues.

In 2003, a review of non-native species policy in GB reached
similar conclusions, noting that the parts of the IAS regime that were
234
the “most developed” were those that affected economic interests.
One of the challenges stemmed from the fact that IAS regulation
inherently cuts across many policy interests. At present, the
executive responsibilities for non–native species issues are devolved
and administrative responsibilities are also spread across different
Government Departments and Agencies in each part of Great
Britain. There is a variety of statutory powers under different
legislation and also non-statutory measures in place to address
232. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, STATUS AND TRENDS IN STATE INVASIVE SPECIES
POLICY: 2002–09, 6 (2010).
233. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 21.
234. FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS, supra note 9, at 21.
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235

Part of the reason for this assortment of fragmentary and
overlapping regulation was identified as the lack of a “single
236
Government contact point or lead co-ordinating organisation.”
Accordingly, the review recommended the establishment of a peak body
237
to provide leadership in coordinating the GB regime.
Similar conclusions can be reached with respect to the Australian
238
regime and the need for more harmonised efforts. Indeed, the Senate
Invasive Species Inquiry recommended that:
the Commonwealth Government strengthen its leadership role in the
national effort to combat invasive species by developing a robust
national framework, in consultation with State, Territory and local
239
governments, to regulate, control and manage invasive species.

Unlike the review of non-native species policy in GB, the senate
report stopped short of recommending the establishment of a peak
regulatory body; however, it did set out the key features for a proposed
national framework. These include: a national policy that determines
aims, targets and focus; common definitions; “harmonised state and
territory legislation consistent with the national statutory framework”;
240
and a national information portal to assist with “strategic planning.”
One issue that the Senate did not address was how these objectives
could be achieved in the absence of a unifying instrumentality.
It is theoretically possible that without the guidance of a
centralised body, the states and territories could collaborate amongst
themselves to establish a harmonised IAS regime. In some respects, this
has already been partially achieved with respect to initiatives such as the
241
Weeds of National Significance Program.
This type of program,
however, does not cover the full range of IAS. Moreover, as the review
of non-native species policy in GB pointed out, while it is possible to
boost dialogue and linkages among government departments, this may
242
not be a sufficiently effective coordination pathway. In particular,
where authorities must grapple with decades of ad hoc regulation, it is
almost impossible to achieve an effective regime unless measures are
underpinned by coordination and prioritization of aims and
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 25, Key Recommendation 1.
238. See generally Riley, supra note 11.
239. TURNING BACK THE TIDE, supra note 87, ¶ 8.12.
240. Id. ¶ 8.13.
241. See Weeds of National Significance, available at http://www.weeds.org.au/WoNS/ (last
visited Nov. 2012).
242. DEPARTMENT FOR ENVIRONMENT, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS WORKING GRP., supra
note 9, at 24.
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objectives.
It is also significant to the balance of power issue that in GB, the
fact that legislative power for IAS is divided amongst devolved
legislatures, and that Westminster was not considered a barrier to the
establishment of a peak body. Indeed, it is arguable that the more the
lines of responsibility for IAS are spread out, the more relevant it is to
establish a peak coordinating body. Additionally, a peak body can give
representation to the private sector to enhance a “coherent approach”
244
towards regulation.
In reality, the need to engage with stakeholders from within and
outside government is an important coordination feature that merges
with the composition of coordinating bodies and their associated
advisory panels—a matter that has already been discussed. The
advantages of structuring such broadly based panels not only include
the fact that it gives a voice to a variety of stakeholders, but also extends
to engaging with stakeholders in a way that allows them to have input
into the regulatory process. This means that the processes are better
tailored and understood, and thus more likely to be successful. In
addition, these panels act as a catalyst for facilitating regulatory
dialogue. The NISC, for example, provides a one-on-one service, where
it consults and advises States on the development of management plans
and strategies. To implement this program more successfully, members
of the NISC have travelled to States to advise and to “encourage broad
245
coordination efforts.”
The benefits just discussed and the very fact that governance
structures in the US and GB establish peak bodies with a significant
coordination role indicate that PCBs have a crucial role to play. The
importance of their role is also implicit in the three options proffered by
Shine, Williams and Gündling—that each depends on the establishment
of a centralised coordinating body. PCBs therefore offer a better, if not
the best, solution to the difficulty of harmonising and synchronizing
regimes across multi layers of government.
This is not to say, however, that PCBs operate in a vacuum. As the
Senate Invasive Species Inquiry noted, if the Federal government were
to take on a more comprehensive role, it would not likely succeed
without strong support from the States.
[T]he Commonwealth will be dependent on State and Territory cooperation by virtue of the distribution of most invasive species. The
legislation is likely to be ineffective in the management of invasive
species in Australia if it does not support and encourage other
243. Id. at 22–24.
244. Id. at 25.
245. NATIONAL INVASIVE SPECIES COUNCIL (NISC), supra note 126, at 13.
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jurisdictions to participate.

The Senate’s conclusion clearly acknowledges that centralized
regulation needs the support of those who actually carry out the ground
work. Yet, if regimes are to operate along national frameworks, it will
invariably require some changes to existing institutions and practices,
even if these are not mandated from the top. Australia’s experience with
respect to the Weeds of National Significance program demonstrated
that States found it extremely challenging to participate in national
247
frameworks within their existing structures. At the same time, as the
ELI has pointed out, states are hesitant to reconfigure existing
248
regulation specifically to introduce new IAS regimes.
At the heart of these dilemmas lie issues stemming from the
Federal-state relationship and in particular, jurisdiction over trade. In
Australia and the US for example, the Federal government regulates
international trade and border controls, which cover the movement of a
249
significant volume of potentially invasive species. Thus, the onus of
preventing entry of IAS is largely placed on the Federal government,
while the states are more focused on controlling and eradicating existing
250
IAS. Accordingly, support by a central body that takes into account
this division of functions is crucial to the success of nationwide IAS
regulation. Moreover, the form that such support takes is important to
determining governance structures of the IAS regime. It is unlikely, for
example, that States and Territories would concur on a full-scale
Federal takeover of IAS regulation. A case in point is the Australasian
states’ opposition to the Invasive Species Bill. An analogous situation
exists in the US: a report by the General Accounting Office noted
resistance by the States to enhancing the legislative underpinning of the
NISC, even though
[almost] all of the Invasive Species Advisory Committee . . .
Officials from USDA, the Department of Defense, and EPA . . .
[advised] . . . that legislative authority, if properly written, would
make it easier for Council agencies to implement the management
plan, as implementing actions under the executive order are
perceived to be lower in priority than are programs that have been
251
legislatively mandated.

246. TURNING BACK THE TIDE, supra note 87, ¶ 7.53.
247. Id.
248. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, supra note 9.
249. Read D. Porter & Nina C. Robertson, Tracking Implementation of the Special Need
Request Process Under the Plant Protection Act, 41 ENVTL. REP. 1000, 1002 (2011) (discussing
the Federal government's almost overarching control over invasive species control).
250. Discussion with Stanley Burgiel, supra note 128.
251. U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., supra note 138, at 14.
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harmonisation of policy and encouragement of uniformity in key
regulatory indicators, such as uniform definitions.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper undertook a comparative study to evaluate the utility of
peak bodies as coordinating mechanisms in IAS regimes. In particular,
the study considered whether such bodies can improve regulation in the
context of multi-layered regulatory systems—a consideration that is
particularly important to Federal systems of government.
The study was prompted by the evolution of IAS regimes in the
US and GB towards a peak coordinating body model. This contrasts
with Australia’s regime, which is based on a collection of individual
components that are loosely coordinated for particular IAS, such as
those covered by the Weeds of National Significance program. An
Australian Senate investigation on the feasibility of enhancing Federal
leadership for IAS concluded that many proposed coordination
mechanisms would not only duplicate existing measures but also
trespass upon the division of powers set out in the Australian
Constitution.
The reasons the Australian Senate gave for rejecting a greater
leadership role by the Federal government were context-specific and
driven by an inquiry to determine whether a Federal, legislative-based
regime would serve Australia well. Although the Senate vetoed the
adoption of the legislation, it nevertheless acknowledged that the
Federal government needed to take a greater leadership role. The
impediment at the time of the Senate report was the use of a legislativebased model that was emphatically rejected by the States. The
experience in the US and GB, however, demonstrates that there are
advantages to using a peak coordinating body; and that furthermore,
such a body need not be premised on a central legislature, overriding
state and territory regimes. Indeed, experience in the US has shown that
peak coordinating bodies foster a range of formal and informal
discussions on topics that may not be covered by legislation or
regulation. This can be particularly crucial in circumstances requiring
prompt action—for example, when there was an increased risk of IAS
in the US due to marine debris following the 2012 tsunami in Japan. In
such cases, a peak coordinating body can serve as a forum for
253
discussion and support on how best to address the issue.
In reality, the policy approaches of Australia, the US and GB
recognize that coordination of activities is essential to the success of
their IAS regimes. Given this broadly similar policy approach, it might
253. Discussion with Stanley Burgiel, supra note 128.
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have been expected that the regimes themselves would be designed
along similar lines. Yet, this is not the case and coordination systems in
Australia lag behind those of the US and GB. The conclusion drawn
from this study is that the problems faced by Australia in designing an
effective IAS regime are similar to the problems faced by the US and
GB at the time of the respective introductions of their systems. The
Australian regime, however, has not addressed the coordination issue to
any great extent. Consequently, Australia can benefit by examining
developments occurring abroad. This is especially helpful in
jurisdictions where the establishment of peak coordinating bodies draws
together regulation established at different levels of government; indeed
making the whole worth more than the sum of its parts.

